Understanding God Incarnate
THOMAS V. MORRIS
The doctrine of the Incarnation is the central Christian
conviction that the man Jesus of Nazareth was and is God
Incarnate , the Second Person of the divine Trinity, God the Son, a
properly divine individual, in human nature. In Jesus, we are
confronted by one person in two natures, human and divine. Since
being formulated carefully at the Council of Chalcedon in 45 l A.O. ,
the two-natures view of Christ has served as a cornerstone of
Christian faith through all subsequent centuries, up until the
present day.
But like many other fundamental, traditional
Christian convictions, in recent years it has undergone a barrage of
severe criticism and has become a focus of widespread controversy.
A great deal of that controversy has arisen in England where on
occasion it seems that nearly everyone with an education and a
typewriter has a penchant for theological disputation. Recall for
example the publicity surrounding Bishop John Robinson's book
Honest to God, whose publication in 1963 set off an explosion of
reviews, response articles and letters to the editors of professional
journals, popular magazines and newspapers.
In 1977, the
publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick,
had the same sort of result, generating and focusing much of the
controversy that currently surrounds the doctrine of the
Incarnation . Within months of its appearance, The Myth of God
Incarnate was answered by another collection of essays entitled The
Truth of God Incarnate. This soon was followed by another book
The Myth / Truth of God Incarnate, and another called simply God
Incarnate, with one more entitled Incarnation and Myth: The
Debate Continued hot on its heels, and so on, and so on.
In America, it seems that the only religious controversy we have
had even approaching these dimensions is the evolution-creation
debate, and that has attained its level of publicity only because of
the practical and legal questions of what should be taught in the
schools.
In general, we have tended to keep our disputes in
philosophical theology modestly confined to a few professional
journals. However, the recent attacks on Christian orthodoxy now
threaten to enter the popular press and the pubic arena on this side
of the Atlantic as well. To illustrate this let me quote from, of all
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things, a diet book published by a popular American
months ago, with the rather ambitious subtitle How to
and Change the World.
Paging through this little
shopping mall bookstore, I found sandwiched between
fat and roughage the statement:

press a few
L ose Weight
book in a
chapters on

Christian dogma contains a number of flagrant contradictions,
such as: that the same thing is both one and three things (the
Trinity) ... and that something can be both human and divine
(Christ).1
Now, how such a claim finds its way into a diet book I won' t
linger to explain. But let me comment on the specific charge that
this author, in common with many others, makes; the charge that
there is something logically or conceptually wrong with the
doctrine of the Incarnation . In particular I want to examine the
structure of that charge, sketch out one defensive strategy fo r
turning it back, and then outline two interestingly diffe re nt
attempts to explicate the doctrine coherently by elaborating on the
metaphysics of the Incarnation.
The charge of flagrant contradiction, or, more cautiously, of
incoherence, or even more cautiously yet, the charge of
metaphysical impossibility, has been repeated in various forms
quite often in recent years by critics of the doctrine of the
Incarnation . Basically, the sort of argument most of them seem to
have in mind is roughly something like the following: On a
standard and traditional conception of deity, God is omn ipote nt,
omniscient, incorporeal, impeccable and necessarily existent, among
other things.
Moreover, by our definition of "God," such
properties as these are, so to speak, constitutive of deity--it is
impossible that any individual be divine, or exemplify di vinity,
without having these properties. To claim some individual to be
divine without being omnipotent, say, or necessarily existent ,
would be on this view just as incoherent as supposing some
individual to be both a bachelor and married at one and the same
time. By contrast, we human beings seem clearly to e xe mplify the
logical complement (or "opposite") of each of these constitutive
divine attributes.
We are limited in power, restricted in
knowledge, embodied in flesh, liable to sin and are contingent
creations. Jesus is claimed in the doctr ine of the Incarnation to
have been both fully human and fully divine. But it is logicall y
impossible for any being to exemplify at one and the same time
both a property and its logical complement. Thus, recent c ritics
have concluded, it is logically impossible for any one person to be
both human and divine, to have all the attributes proper to deity
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and all those ingredient in human nature as well. The doctrine of
the Incarnation on this view is an incoherent theological
development of the early church which must be discarded by us in
favor of some other way of conceptualizing the importance of Jesus
for Christian faith.
He could not possibly have been God
Incarnate, a literally divine person in human nature.
As I have addressed this challenge to the doctrine of the
Incarnation in great detail elsewhere, in The Logic of God
Incarnate, I shall give only a relatively brief indication here of how
it can be answered.2 A lengthy response is not required in order
for us to be able to see how this currently popular sort of objection
can be turned back.
A couple of very simple metaphysical
distinctions will provide us with the basic apparatus for defending
orthodoxy against this charge, which otherwise can seem to be a
very formidable challenge indeed.
As it usually is presented, the sort of argument I have just
outlined treats humanity and divinity, or human nature and divine
nature, as each constituted by a set of properties individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for exemplifying that nature, for
being human, or for being divine. Such an argument most often
depends implicitly on a sort of essentialist metaphysic which has
been around for quite awhile, and which recently has experienced a
resurgence of popularity among philosophers. On such a view,
objects have two sorts of properties, essential and accidental.
Roughly speaking, a property can be essential to an object in either
of two ways. It is simply part of an individual's essence if the
individual which has it could not have existed without having it. It
is a kind-essential property if its exemplification is necessary for
an individual's belonging to a particular kind, for example, humankind. Human nature, then, consists in a set of properties severally
necessary and jointly sufficient for being human. And the same is
true of divine nature. The critic of the Incarnation begins with the
simple truth that there are many properties humans have which
God could not possibly have, goes on to assume that these
properties, or at least some of them, are essential properties of
being human, properties without which no one could be fully
human, and then concludes that no divine being could possibly
become a human being. The conclusion would be well drawn if
the assumption was correct. But it is this assumption we must
question.
Once a distinction between essential and accidental properties is
accepted, a distinction employed in this sort of argument against
incarnation, another simple distinction follows in its wake. Among
properties ordinarily characterizing human beings, some are
essential elements of human nature, but many just happen to be
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common human properties without also being essential. Consider
for example the property of having ten fingers. It is a common
human property, one possessed by a great number of people, but it
clearly is not a property essential to being human. People lose
fingers without thereby ceasing to be human . Further, consider a
common property which safely can be said to be a universal human
property, one had by every human being in history--the property
of living at some time on the surface of the earth. Obviously this
is not an essential human property either. It is clearly possible that
at some time in the future, human beings be born, live and die on
a space station, or on another planet colonized by earth, without
ever setting foot on the earth itself. So it is not a safe inference to
reason simply from a property's being common or even universal
among human beings that it is an essential human property, strictl y
necessary for exemplifying human nature.
The relevance of this distinction to the doctrine of the
Incarnation should be obvious . It is certainly quite common fo r
human beings to lack omnipotence, omniscience, necessary
existence, and so on. I think any orthodox Christian will agree
that, apart from Jesus, these are even universal features of human
existence . Further, in the case of any of us who do exemplify the
logical complements of these distinctively divine attributes, it may
well be most reasonable to hold that they are in our case essential
attributes. I, for example, could not possibly become omnipotent.
As a creature, I am essentially limited in power. But why think
this is true on account of human nature? Why think that any
attributes incompatible with deity are elements of human natu re,
properties without which one could not be truly or fully human ?
It's important here to draw another distinction. An individual is
fully human just in case that individual has all essential human
properties, all the properties composing basic human nature. An
individual is merely human if he has all those properties plus so me
additional limitation properties as well, properties such as that of
lacking omnipotence, that of lacking omniscience, and so on.
It is the claim of orthodox Christology that Jesus was fully
human without being merely human. He had all properties strictly
constitutive of human nature, but also had higher properties as
well, those properties distinctively constitutive of deit y. What is
crucial to realize here is that an orthodox Christian perspective on
human nature will just categorize all human properties logically
incompatible with a divine incarnation as, at most , essential to
being merely human, or, more exactly, as individually-esse ntial , not
kind-essential, properties of those of us who are merely human.
No orthodox theologian has ever held that Jesus was merely huma n,
only that he was fully human. It is held that the person who was
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God Incarnate had the full array of attributes essential to
humanity, and all those essential to divinity.
I am suggesting that, armed with a few simple distinctions, the
orthodox Christian can clarify his conception of human nature in
such a way as to provide for the coherence and metaphysical
possibility of the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation. But I am
sure it will be objected by many that to use these distinctions to
explicate what Chalcedon and the rest of the church has had in
mind about Jesus is to land oneself in some well-known absurdities.
On the Chalcedonian picture, it seems, Jesus was omniscient,
omnipotent, necessarily existent and all the rest, as well as being an
itinerant Jewish preacher. But this has appeared outlandish to most
contemporary theologians. Did the bouncing baby boy of Mary
and Joseph direct the workings of the cosmos from his crib? Was
this admittedly remarkable man, as he sat in a boat or under a fig
tree, actually omnipresent in all of creation? Did this carpenter's
son exist necessarily? These apparent implications of orthodoxy
can sound just too bizarre for even a moment's consideration,
despite any amount of what critics often see as no more than
metaphysical magic, or hypostatic hocus-pocus, we might engage in
to save the doctrine.
At this point we face two distinct problems. First, it may be
difficult to imagine how anyone could be genuinely human from
first to last while exemplifying the full array of divine attributes.
It may be just simply beyond belief that such an individual would
share the human condition. Second, when we study the biblical
portrayal of Christ, we do find ourselves presented with an
extraordinary individual, but as a matter of fact the Jesus of the
Gospels seems not to have been exemplifying all those impressive
Was he omnipotent?
He grew tired.
divine attributes.
Omniscient? On at least one occasion he indicated there was
something he did not know. Omnipresent? At one time he was in
Jericho; at another time in Jerusalem. He walked from one place
to another.
By means of the sorts of distinctions I have already sketched
out, we can defend the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation against
direct charges of logical inconsistency. But we need much more
than this if we are to make sense of the doctrine, if we are to
come to any significant understanding of what it could mean for
Jesus to be God Incarnate. What we are forced to consider is
whether an account of the Incarnation can be provided which will
on the one hand recognize Christ as a properly divine being in

accordance with conciliar orthodoxy, and yet on the other hand
clearly allow his earthly sojourn a genuinely human quality, such as
what we find portrayed in the Gospels. I want to present the
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outlines of two very different attempts to provide such an acco unt,
and along the way indicate some of my own grounds for preferring
one to the other.
In the nineteenth century a view was developed which has come
to be known as "kenoticism" (from kenosis, the Greek word for
emptying; see Philippians 2:5-8). The central claim of kenotic
christology is that in order to enter the earthly stream of huma n
life, God the Son voluntarily and temporarily laid aside, or emptied
himself of, all those metaphysical attributes of deity which
Some people
otherwise would preclude such an incarnation.
understand kenoticism to involve the claim that the Son gave up all
the distinctively metaphysical attributes of deity for his time among
us, while yet retaining all the moral qualities which are prope rl y
divine. But of course it is just impossible that all the me taphysica l
attributes of deity be temporarily laid aside. No individual could
possibly cease to be eternal, or immutable, or necessarily existent,
for a brief period of time, not even a being with the most
astounding powers of self-limitation. But it can be argued in
defense of a kenotic christology that the kenotic maneuver need
not be applied to these properties. For example, relying on the
distinction between common and essential human properties, and
the distinction between being fully human and being merely
human, we can argue (I think, quite plausibly) that the properties
of coming into existence at some time (a contrary of eternality) and
contingency (the contradictory of necessity) are just not kindessential properties for being fully human. Thus, the individual
who was Jesus could have been both necessary and eternal in bas ic
metaphysical status while taking on the nature of a full y human
being. Furthermore, there are construals of divine immutability
which will allow the possibility of a divine incarnation, although
none of them will allow a movement of kenosis with respect to
immutability itself. But this is unnecessary anyway, since on the
sort of understanding of immutability clearly compatible with a
divine incarnation, God the Son could perfectly well retain his
proper immutability while yet exemplifying the fullness of human
nature. In short, it can be argued that, armed with the distinctions
we have drawn concerning human nature, we can see that any
divine attributes which do not allow of kenosis do not require it
either in order to be compatible with an incarnation into hum an
nature.
But I need to say something about how Jesus' hav ing these
kenotically recalcitrant metaphysical attributes need not have any
absurd implications for orthodoxy. First, it is an ancient, and
independently plausible, claim that no person is strictly identical
with his body. Even a modern materialist who holds that all
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personality is necessarily embodied need not deny this. So the
necessary existence of God the Son, with its implications that He
cannot have begun to exist and cannot cease to exist, and therefore
is eternal, does not entail that the earthly body in which He
incarnated Himself had these properties. His body was conceived,
and grew like any other human body.
Likewise, the kenotic
theologian must hold, a person is not identical with any particular
range of conscious experience, or any particular set of belief states,
he might have . So the eternality of God the Son need not entail
the comprehensive continuity of His cognitive states from His preincarnate mode of existence as God into His earthly childhood.
The kenotic theologian thus allows that the earthly mind-set, along
with the earthly body, came into existence and grew. Nothing
about the necessity, eternality or immutability (in a sense to be
explicated) of the divine Son need preclude this.
It is a standard kenotic claim that God the Son temporarily gave
up His omniscience for the course of the earthly stage of the
Incarna tion. From all eternity, He had been omniscient. For
roughly three decades He was not. But upon His Ascension, and
for all eternity future, He continues now to enjoy that maximal
noetic state once again. This is the kenotic story about God the
Son's knowledge. Clearly, it allows both the orthodox claim that
Jesus was God, and the biblical claim that He grew in wisdom as a
child.
It is fairly easy to explicate coherently the kenotic allegation that
the Son voluntarily and temporarily gave up His omniscience, later
For consider Shorty, a spy who is going on a
to regain it.
dangerous mission in which he will have to pretend to be a great
scientist with amnesia. So that he will not succumb to questioning
under torture if suspected, Shorty is given a limited- amnesia
producing pill, and an antidote for later use. Clearly, such a
scenario seems perfectly coherent. And in relevant respects it
parallels the kenotic claim about Christ.
Temporarily failing to exemplify the property of omniscience
thus seems, at least so far, to be a possibility. But what of
omnipotence and omnipresence? Perhaps the best understanding of
the attribute of omnipresence is that of its being the property of
being present everywhere in virtue of knowledge of and power
over any and every spatially located object. A divine being would
then presumably divest himself of that attribute by divesting
Omnipotence,
himself of the requisite power or knowledge.
however, may not so simply fit into the kenotic scheme. It, like
immutability, is what we might call an internally modalized
attribute. Being omnipotent is, very roughly, being able (having
the power) to do anything it would be logically possible (in the
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broadly logical sense) for a maximally perfect being to do. Now,
let us attempt to describe a case of fully voluntary kenosis with
respect to this property. A being, S, is omnipotent from ti to t2,
voluntarily divests himself of this property from t3 to t5, and
regains it at t6. What exactly is the state of S's power or abilities
at t4 , during the period of kenosis? If the state of kenosis is
entirely and thoroughly voluntary, at t4 S has the ability (an ability
which he freely refrains from exercising) to re-exempt ify
omnipotence. But at t4, if S can be such that he can do anything
logically possible for a maximally perfect being, then at that time
he can do anything logically possible for such a being--in other
words, it seems he is still omnipotent. If he cannot at t4 take up
his omnipotence again , he is not in a state of the thoroughl y
voluntary, temporary relinquishing of it.
If the kenotic theologian is committed to the complete
voluntariness of the state of the Incarnation, he thus may not be
able to hold that God the Son temporarily ceased to be omnipotent.
But if the Son then lacked at least omniscience, one piece of
knowledge He may be said to have lacked is the knowledge of His
being omnipotent. And anyone who has restricted his knowledge
of the range of his own power may be argued thereby to have
restricted the exercise of his power, since, presumably, no one
usually draws on resources he does not believe he has.
By maneuvers such as this, kenoticism can attempt to explain
how it is that:
l. Omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence are properly
divine attributes;
2. Jesus was divine as well as human; but,
3. During the decades of His time among us on earth, this
individual appeared to have none of these attributes.
The kenotic strategy has had many critics, but most of them have
failed to appreciate the subtleties of a limited kenotic picture with
elements such as these. When combined with the distinctions we
have drawn concerning human nature, the kenotic maneuver
applied to the attribute of omniscience alone can appear to go a
significant way toward ridding orthodoxy of any apparently absurd
implications.
I do not, however, find the traditional kenotic strategy full y
plausible, or even very attractive. I'll mention here only a couple
of problems I think it faces. First, given any traditional and
standard analysis of the divine attributes, kenoticism requires a
general view of the modalities of those attributes which is less than
fully satisfactory. Second, on the same condition, it necessitates
abandoning any plausible, substantive metaphysical ascription of
immutability to God, of even a quite moderate form .
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The first point about modality is this. As I mentioned earlier, it
is a fairly standard theistic view that there are properties essential
to being God, attributes which can be considered to be constitutive
of deity. Omnipotence and omniscience are clear and relatively
uncontroversial as examples of such properties. It is impossible, on
this view, for an individual to be God, or to be literally divine,
without being omnipotent and omniscient. Many orthodox theists,
in particular many of those who endorse an Anselmian conception
of God , go further and hold that omnipotence, omniscience and the
other attributes constitutive of deity form not only something like
the kind- essence of deity, but also serve as components of the
individual-essence of any being who is God. Moreover, many also
go on to hold the even more stringent and exalted view that no
individual can possibly count as God unless it is essentially
possessed of maximal power, and likewise for the other attributes
constitutive of deity.
On this view, there is a collection of
attributes an individual must have, and must have essentially, in
order to be strictly, literally divine.
It should be clear that on this modally exalted view of deity,
divine kenosis as I have explicated it so far would be an
impossibility. No individual can give up temporarily a property he
has essentially. If any being who is divine must have all the
metaphysically distinctive attributes of deity essentially, none of
them could be given up by him temporarily, while he yet
continued to exist. If omniscience is an essential property of God
the Son, He could not have given it up temporarily. If it is merely
a requisite of deity, but not a part of His individual essence, He
could have given it up, but He would thereby have ceased to be
God. So the earthly period of the Incarnation would not, after all,
have presented us with an individual with the two natures of
humanity and divinity simultaneously. On either understanding of
the modal status of omniscience, the traditional kenotic strategy as
so far presented cannot be used to explicate and defend the
orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation.
Now consider for a moment the ascription of immutability to
God.
A number of prominent theists throughout history have
understood God's immutability to be the property of being
absolutely incapable of undergoing or engaging in any sort of real
change whatsoever.
It's obvious that this extreme sort of
immutability would disallow the possibility of a divine kenosis.
But what is important to note is that even moderate construals of
immutability would render kenosis impossible.
Consider, for

example, the conception according to which divine immutability
consists in simply the impossibility of any individual's beginning to
have or ceasing to have any of the attributes distinctive of deity,
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such as omnipotence or omniscience.
Such a conception is
moderate in that it allows many sorts of change in the case of God,
but it is nonetheless a conception of divine immutability because it
disallows the possibility of basic change with respect to the
exemplification of the distinctively divine attributes. This is a
view I think many traditional theists, including Christian theists,
would endorse, and it is also a view which rules out the kenotic
strategy for defending the doctrine of the Incarnation, at least in
So again at this point, traditional kenotic
its standard form.
christology is incompatible with a view which is otherwise very
attractive to theists.
But why accept any of these views about the modal status of the
divine attributes? It has been suggested by some very traditional,
conservative theists that these modal claims are untrue. Stephen
Davis, for example, has claimed to see no reason to think that
omniscience is necessary for being divine. Other philosophers have
suggested that on a certain view of the Trinity, the divine persons
may differ in the modal status of their attributes; for example, it
could be that God the Father is essentially omniscient, and that
God the Son exemplifies that property only contingently, being
capable of ceasing to have it for a while. If we make less than the
most modally exalted claims for deity, the standard kenotic strategy
will be a live option for displaying the coherence of the
Incarnation and explicating some of its features. But it seems to
me that there are plausible grounds of an Anselmian sort to make
such strong modal claims for deity as those I have mentioned. If
such claims clearly prohibited an incarnation, I would join Davis
and others in relinquishing them. For any Anselmian intuitions on
which they are ultimately based are after all defeasible. But I am
inclined to think that these modally maximal claims can be made
for God and can be reconciled quite well with the evident facts of
the career of Jesus that kenoticism tries to accommodate. If I can
go some distance toward showing this, I can thereby provide some
reason for thinking that the modal background of standard
kenoticism represents at least an unnecessary weakening of the
claims many traditional theists otherwise want to make about God.
I want to sketch out an alternative to kenoticism which accords
with a modally exalted conception of deity. It is a perspective
which may even comport with the most extreme understanding of
divine immutability, if that construal is compatible with any divine
agency in a world such as ours. It is clearly a perspective which
stands fully consistent with the more moderate version of divine
immutability most theists are prepared to endorse. In many ways it
seems to me to offer a picture, or model, of the Incarnation which
is superior to that provided by a kenotic view. The view I want to
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present can be called, succinctly, if possibl y somewhat
misleadingly, " the two-minds view of Christ." It is an ancient
view which has been relatively neglected for a long time. I believe
some distinctively modern perspectives can be drawn upon to
explicate it and display its plausibility.
Recall first of all a claim needed for kenoticism, the claim that
no person is identical with any particular range of conscious
experience, or collection of belief states, he might have. I think
that the truth of this claim will follow from any modally plausible
and metaphysically careful account of what a person is. With this
in mind, we can begin to appreciate the early view that in the case
of God Incarnate, we must recognize something like two distinct
ranges of consciousness. There is first what we can call the eternal
mind of God the Son with its distinctively divine consciousness,
whatever that might be like, encompassing the full scope of
omn1sc1ence.
And , in addition, there is a distinctly earthly
consciousness which came into existence and grew and developed as
the boy Jesus grew and developed. It drew its visual imagery from
what the eyes of Jesus saw, and its concepts from the languages he
The earthly range of consciousness, and selflearn ed.
consciousness, was thoroughly human, Jewish and first century
Palestinian in nature.
We can view the two ranges of consciousness (and, analogously,
the two noetic structures encompassing them) as follows: The divine
mind of God the Son contained, but was not contained by, His
earthly mind, or range of consciousness. That is to say, there was
what can be called an asymmetric accessing relation between the
two minds. Think, for example, of two computer p rograms or
informational systems, one containing but not contained by the
other. The divine mind had full and direct access to the earthly,
human experience being had through the Incarnation, but the
earthly consciousness did not have such full and direct access to the
content of the over-arching omniscience proper to the Logos; only
such access, on occasion, as the divine mind allowed it to have.
There thus was a meta physical and personal depth to the man Jesus
lacking in the case of every individual who is merely human.
T his account allows for the apparent intellectual and spiritual
growth of Jesus in His humanity to be a real development. And
when it is used in connection with the distinctions we have drawn
concerning human nature, we have in principle a full a nd adequate
account of the basic features of the metaphysics of the Incarnation.
In particular, this view allows us to avoid the absurdities to which

orthodoxy has always seemed vulnerable. On it, we have in the
person of Jes us no case of a God merely dressed up as a man. We
have an individual who is fully human, and who shares in the
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human condition, experiencing the world in a human perspective.
Nor is it
No docetic absurdities are implied by the view.
Nestorian.
Nor Appolinarian. There is one person with two
natures, and two ranges of consciousness. He is not the theological
equivalent of a centaur, half God and half man. He is fully
human, but not merely human. He is also fully divine.
The two-minds view seems to me, further, to be a clear
improvement over standard kenoticism. When He became a man,
God the Son did not give up anything of deity, He merely took on
the nature and condition of humanity. We can capture full well
the New Testament claim that in the Incarnation, God the Son
humbled Himself, without following keno tic christology in holding
that He gave up any metaphysical attributes distinctive of deity.
His humbling consisted rather in His rendering Himself vulnerable
to the pains, sufferings, aggravations and agonies which became
His as a man but which, in His exclusively divine form of
existence, could not have touched Him this way. It is not by virtue
of what He gave up, but in virtue of what He took on, that He
humbled Himself. This sort of divine kenosis was a feature of the
Incarnation, but so understood, it is a f eatu re which accords
logically with strong claims concerning the modality and
immutability of the attributes distinctive of, and traditionally held
to be constitutive of deity. No kenotic move with any of those
attributes is required for ridding orthodoxy of any appearance of
absurdity.
But can we really understand what it is to attribute two minds,
or two ranges of consciousness, to one person? That depends on
what is required for understanding the claim. Can we know what
it is like to be a God-man? Well, can we know what it is like to
be a bat? It is hard, if possible at all, to imagine what a sonarconsciousness is like. Likewise, we do not, and cannot, know what
it is like to be God, at least not in the way we know what it is like
to be a human being. It is no objection to my suggestions that it is
impossible in this sense to know what it would be like to be a
God-man with two related but distinct ranges of consciousness.
But as a matter of fact, we can fill out some significant level of
understanding concerning the claim by way of some analogies.
I have suggested already a computer or artificial intelligence
analogy. Consider two or three others. First, an interesting, and
interestingly parallel, dream phenomenon is reported by many
people. It is an experience I think I have had myself on more than
one occasion. The dreamer is having a dream with a large cast of
characters.
The dreamer himself is one of those characters,
pe rceiving the internal environs of the dream and taking part in its
action "from within." But, at the same time, the dreamer "as
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sleeper" is somehow aware, in what could be called an overarching
level of consciousness, that it is just a dream that is going on, in
which he is playing a role as one of the characters. If in fact there
is in such an experience a twofold consciousness, one "within" the
dream, the other "outside" the dream simultaneously, then we
have, if not a model, then at least an analogy of some value in
helping us to get some imaginative grip on the two- minds picture
of the Incarnation. It is possible, though, that in such experiences
the dreamer is very rapidly alternating between two perspectives.
And of course this would provide no model or particularly good
analogy at all.
Consider the common claim in twentieth-century psychology
that there are various strata to the ordinary human mind. The
postulated unconscious, or subconscious, mind would stand in an
asymmetric accessing relation to the conscious mind somewhat
parallel to that postulated between the divine consciousness and the
earthly consciousness of God Incarnate. If modern psychology is
even possibly right in this postulation, one person can have
different levels or ranges of mentality. In the case of Jesus, there
would then be a very important extra depth had in virtue of His
being divine.
Finally, there are cases of commissurotomy, multiple personality
and even hypnosis, in which we are confronted by what seems to
be, in some significant sense, a single individual human being, one
person, but one person with apparently two or more distinct
strea ms or ranges of consciousness, distinct domains of experience.
Now, of course, there are philosophers who claim that in many if
not all cases of multiple, simultaneous ranges of experience
associated with the stimulation of one human body, the requisite
conditions are Jacking for judging there to be a single person who
is the ultimate bearer of the disparate sets of experience. Some
theorists identify each discrete range of consciousness in the
commissurotomy patient, and each personality in the case of a
multiple personality, as a person. Such a claim is less often made
with respect to different levels of consciousness or divergent
streams of awareness associated with cases of hypnotism. But, in
any case, the sort of identification can be argued to be implausible.
If one troubling, aberrant personality is eliminated therapeutically
from the behavioral repertoire of someone afflicted with multiple
personalities, the therapist surely need not see the effect of his
work as the killing of a person. Moreover, it is plausible, and
indeed illuminating, to view normal persons as either having or
even being systems of systems of mentality or experience. And,
again, if it is even conceivable that one person have,
simultaneously, such distinct ranges of mentality, we may have
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here, in at least some of the more unusual cases, vivid, partial
analogies which can help us to gain some firmer understanding of
the two-minds view.
As a matter of fact, in some cases of multiple personality, there
exists one personality with apparently full and direct knowledge of
the experiences had, information gathered, and action initiated by
one or more other personalities, a sort of knowledge which is not
had by any other personality concerning it. In other words, there
seem to exist asymmetric accessing relations in such cases
interestingly, though of course not perfectly, parallel to the sort of
relation claimed by the two-minds view to hold between the divine
and human minds of Christ.
Does the two-minds view then present the Incarnation as a case
of split-personality on the part of God the Son? And if so, should
not the recognition of this alone suffice for a rejection of the view
as an unworthy, demeaning characterization of Christ? Does what
initially can appear to serve as a partial explication of orthodoxy
end up amounting to no more than a gross impiety?
First of all, the reference to some phenomena of multiple
personality here is intended only to provide a partial analogy for
some of what the two-minds view claims to be true in the case of
Christ. It is to have no more than the limited, but hopefully
helpful, function of providing some understanding of, and
imaginative grip on, the central elements of the two-minds view.
It thus is intended to serve the same function as the computer (AI)
analogy, the dream analogy, and the reference to the classic
distinction between the conscious and unconscious, or subconscious,
mind . It is not intended to be a complete modelling of the noetic
f ea tu res of the Incarnation.
Furthermore, the analogy or partial parallel is in no way
demeaning to God the Son. To see this we must ask exactly what
it is about the phenomena of multiple personality generally which
renders the state of exhibiting such phenomena a bad state to be in
for a human being, a state which it would be better to be without.
The answer is, I think, quite simple. Typical cases of multiple
personality exhibit two negative features: they are not mental
states, or arrangements, voluntarily entered into by the person who
exhibits the phenomena, and they are not mental states, or
arrangements, conducive to the attainment of goals valuable to the
person involved.
Both these features are, on any orthodox
deployment of the two-minds views, absent from the case of
Christ's exemplification of two minds. His taking on of a human
mind was entirely voluntary. And, given any traditional account of
the purpose of the Incarnation, it was conducive to, if not in fact
necessary for, the attainment of goals valuable to God. So it seems
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to me that we have no reason from this quarter to hesitate using
whatever parallel phenomena we find in psychologically unusual
human cases to help us to understand the relevant aspects of the
Incarnation.
The two-minds view of Christ allows us to take seriously the
human limitations of the earthly career of Jesus without incurring
the metaphysical and modal costs of kenoticism. I believe it is a
very powerful picture, and that it can be an important ingredient
in philosophically explicating the orthodox doctrine of the
Incarnation and defending it against all forms of the contemporary
incoherence challenge.
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